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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE FARM MUTUAL ATUOMOBILE * 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
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Respondent * 
VS. * APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
THOMAS LAYTON MASTBAUM * No. 19779 
and KATHLEEN MARIE MASTBAUM 
* 
Defendants and 
Appellants * 
NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff brouqht this action in the District Court of Cache 
County, Civil Action No. 2177? against the Defendant for declar-
atory relief claiming that the Family Exlusions Provision of the 
insurance policv issued to the Defendant, Thomas Lavton Mastbaum, 
excuses the Plaintiff from defending the Defendant, Thomas Lavton 
Mastbaum, in a civil action filed aaainst him by his wife 
resulting from an automobile action on May 30, 1981, near Garden 
Citvf Utah. A civil action filed in the District Court of Cache 
County, entitled Kathleen Marie Mastbaum v. Thomas Layton 
Mastbaum, Civil no. 21668, is civil action seeking damages for 
injuries sustained to Mrs. Mastbaum resulting from the above men-
tioned accident. 
Plaintiff, State Farm, further sought declaratory judgment 
in this separate suit seeking determination that the insurance 
policy in question does not provide coverage for the benefit of 
Kathleen Marie Mastbaum and that the Plaintiff had no duty to 
adjust or to pay the claim which may be awarded in her favor in 
such litigation. Civil No. 21668. 
Defendants Mastbaums1 Counterclaim in this action asserting 
that the Family Exclusion Provision of insurance contract and the 
Doctrine of Interspousal Tort Immunity was violative of public 
policy in general and violative of public policy behind the Utah 
Safety Responsibility Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-2-4? 
and Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 11. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Cache County rendered a Summary 
Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants 
upholding the validity of the Family Exclusion Provision of the 
insurance contract in question. That the suit filed by Mrs. 
Mastbaum against Mr. Mastbaum, Civil No. 21668, is barred because 
of the doctrine of Interspousal Tort Immunity and the Family 
Exclusion Provision. Summary Judqment on both issues was entered 
by the Court in favor of the Plaintiff and against the two 
Defendants on the 2fith of Januarv, 1984. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the Judgment entered by the ^ rial 
Court. That an order of this Court be entered determining that 
the Family Exclusion Provisions of the insurance contract of the 
Plaintiff in the policy issued to the Defendant, Thomas Layton 
Mastbaum, be determined violative of the public policv of the 
State of Utah and violative of public policy behind the Utah 
Safety Responsibility Act, UCA 30-2-14, and Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 11, and that the Court further enter its Order 
that Utah follow the modern trend of authorities in declaring the 
doctrine of Interspousal Tort Immunity does not exist in the 
State of Utah, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 9, 1983, the Defendant, Kathleen Marie 
Mastbaum, as Plaintiff, filed civil action against her husband, 
Thomas Layton Mastbaum, as Defendant, in the District Court of 
Cache County, Civil No. 21668. In the Complaint Mrs. Mastbaum 
alleges that her husband/Defendant was the driver of an automo-
bile in which the Plaintiff was a passenger. That Defendant, 
while under the influence of intoxicated liquor, drove the said 
automobile into an oncoming vehicle near Garden City, Rich 
County, Utah, on Mav 30, 1981, when the Plaintiff sustained severe 
personal injuries including a broken back. Mrs. Mastbaum further 
claims permanent injuries. The Defendant, Thomas Lavton Mastbaum, 
at the time of the accident had an insurance policy with the 
Plaintiff/Respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company. The Plaintiff/Respondent, .State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company filed an answer to the above suit and then com-
menced this separate action for declaratory judgment, which 
Complaint was filed in the District Court of Cache County, Utah 
on or about the 14th day of June, 1983, seeking to avoid respon-
sibility for payment of any sums due to Mrs. Mastbaum and seeking 
the declaration of the Trial Court that the Family Exclusion 
Provision of the insurance contract was valid and enforceable, 
and, Plaintiff/Respondent was not responsible to defend the 
Defendant in Civil action no. 21668 or pay any damages or make 
any settlement in connection therewith. The Defendants, 
Mastbaums in their answer asserted affirmative defenses and 
counterclaims. 
The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff 
on or about the 26th day of January, 1984 on both issues. That 
on the 21st dav of February, 1984 notice of appeal was filed with 
this Court by Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY IS VIOLATIVE OF 
PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THEREFORE IT DOES NOT BAR 
KATHLEEN MARIE MASTBAUM'S SUIT AGAINST HER HUSBAND, THOMAS LAYTON 
MASTBAUM IN CIVIL ACTION NO. 21668, DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
The Doctrine of Interspousal Tort immunity is based upon 
the archaic common law notion that a wife had disabilities which 
prevented her from suing and being sued. This perception of the 
wife's disabilities was based upon a fiction that a husband and 
wife were one, and that the wifefs individuality during marriage 
became merged in that of her husband. All of her personal pro-
perty which the husband could reduce to possession during 
marriage became his, and he had the right of possession, manage-
ment and control of her real estate. During marriage she could 
not sue for damages to her person or property but such suits were 
brought in the name of the husband and any damages recovered 
belonged to him. (See Stoker v. Stoker 616 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 
1980) quoting from Cooley's Blackstone, Volume 1, Book 1, Chapter 
15 page 294.) Under that concent the wife could not sue her hus-
band because of the procedural difficulty which would require the 
husband to sue himself, and also because she would acquire no 
substantive right against him since he would be the owner of what-
ever he recovered in the suit. (Taylor v. Patten, 275 P.2d 696, 
697 (Utah 1954.) Thus, prior to the adoption of the Married 
Women's Acts, the common law view was that upon marriage the 
husband and wife became one, and she could not sue that entity of 
which she was a part. 
Under Utah's Married Women1s Act, this antiquated view of 
the wifefs legal rights is done away with. U.C.A. §30-2-4 (1953 
as amended) states that: 
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor, 
maintain an action therefor in her own name and hold 
the same in her own right, and may prosecute and defend 
all actions for the preservation and protection of her 
rights and property as if unmarried. There shall be 
no right of recovery by the husband on account of 
personal injury or wrong to his wife, or for expenses 
connected therewith, but the wife may recover against 
a third person for such injury or wrong as if unmarried, 
and such recovery shall include expenses of medical 
teatment and other expenses paid or assumed by the 
husband." (emphasis added) 
Defendant submitsf that the above-quoted statute as interpreted 
in Stoker v. Stoker 616 P.2d 590, 591, clearly states that the 
Doctrine of Interspousal Immunity is violative of public policy. 
Plaintiff strongly contends that under Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 
14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963), the Interspousal Immunity 
Doctrine is still applicable to nonintentional tort cases between 
spouses. However, Plaintiff seriously overlooks the affect of 
the Stoker case on the Rubalcava case. The Court in Stoker 615 
P.2d at 590, stated that in: 
••»Rubalcava v. Gisseman and the Union Pacific Railroad., 
this court held the statutes considered Taylor v. Patten 
did not compel the conclusion tort actions should also 
be included in the abrogation of immunity, with actions 
on contracts and prooerty matters. We do not agree, 
(emphasis added) 
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the Stoker case from the 
Rubalcava case by saying Stoker dealt with intentional torts. 
No where in Stoker does the Court make that distinction* In 
fact, as stated above, the only place in Stoker that Rubalcava 
case is cited is in the same paragraph with Taylor v. Patten, 2 
Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954), which was an intentional tort 
suit between spouses. Therefore, in Stoker, Supra, at 590, the 
Court inferred that it did not agree with Rubalcava (an uninten-
tional tort case), and that "tort actions" should also be 
included in the abrogation of immunity. Thus, overruling 
Rubalcava v. Gisseman. 
In support of its overruling Rubalcava v. Gisseman, the 
Court in Stoker v. Stoker further declared at 592: 
Our holding today reaffirms the Legislative abro-
gation of Interspousal Immunity. That the trend in 
our sister states is certainly in consonance with our 
holding today: See 92 A.L.R.3d 901, at p. 923, et seq. 
The court unequivocally held that interspousal immunity had been 
abrogated. No distinction was made between an intentional or 
unintentional tort as plaintiff contends. 
In reference to the Utah's Married Women's Act, supra, the 
Court in Stoker, 616 P.2d at 591 stated: 
The statute authorizes her to prosecute and defend 
all actions for the preservation and protection of 
her rights and property, as if unmarried. It speaks 
of rights and of property in the disjunctive, and, all 
actions for the preservation and protection of her 
rights would certainly include a right to be free 
from an intentional tort of her husband, 
(emphasis added) 
Plaintiff in its memorandum in the Trial Court states that 
the Court in the Stoker case created "some confusion" on this 
issue. Plaintiff asserts that the Rubalcava case stands for the 
point that U.C.A. §30-2-4 does not allow a wife to sue her hus-
band, only third parties. As stated above Stoker v. Stoker 
overrules Rubalcava, but a careful reading of Stoker v.Stoker at 
591, shows the court held that U.C.A. §30-2-4 speaks of the 
wife's rights and of property in the "disjunctive." In 
interpreting the statute's language, which speaks of rights and 
property in the disjunctive, the Court was holding that the sta-
tute uses the phrase "rights and property" in the alternative. 
Therefore, "no confusion" exists as asserted by Plaintiff because 
just as "all actions for the preservation and protection of her 
rights would certainly include a right to be free from an inten-
tional tort of her husband," so too it should include a right to 
be free from a negligent tort of her husband. The Court in 
Stoker held that the statute authorizes her to prosecute and 
defend "all actions" for the preservation and protection of her 
rights and property as if unmarried, which certainly would 
include a negligent tort committed by her husband on her. 
To further support its holdinq that the Interspousal Immun-
ity Doctrine has been abrogated, the Court in Stoker v. Stoker, 
supra, cites two sections of the Constitution of Utah: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and 
no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defendant 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. (Article I, 
Section II, Constitution of Utah.) 
The court states that the Married Women's Act "was enacted 
with full knowledge" of these two provisions. Therefore, as the 
Constitution sets forth "All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedv by due course of law, which shall 
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay." Since the 
Legislature enacted U.C.A. §30-2-4 (1953 as amended) "with full 
knowledge" of these Constitutional provisions, then the wife 
should not be denied remedv for an injury, even if that injury 
was caused by her husband. 
In Stoker the Court further stated that the Married Women1s 
Act is in "derogation of the common law." The Court then quoted 
U.C.A. §68-3-2 (1953 as amended) which controls how a statute in 
derogation of the common law should be construed, The statute 
reads: 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation 
thereof are to be strictly construed has no apolication 
to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish 
the laws of this state resoecting the subjects to which 
they relate, and their orovisions and all oroceedings 
under them are to be liberally construed with a view 
to effect the objects of the statutes and to oromote 
justice, whenever there is anv variance between the 
rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference 
to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 
In applying the above-quoted statute the Court at 591 held that: 
To read into our Married Women's Act, a proscription 
against a wife suing her husband, would be to construe 
it so strictly as to add a provision which the legis-
lature did not put there. 
Therefore, by not allowing defendant in the present case to 
bring suit against her husband for his tortious conduct would also 
be construing the Married Women's Act too strictly, which would 
add a provision that the legislature did not put there. Also, by 
denying defendant's action because of the antiquated common law 
Doctrine of Interspousal Tort Immunity, the Court would not be 
applying U.C.A. §68-3-2 (1953 as amended) properly. Under U.C.A. 
§68-3-2 (1953 as amended) the statutes (Married Women's Act) are 
to be liberally construed "with a view to effect the objects of 
the statutes and to promote justice." Certainly, justice and 
equity would be achieved by allowing defendant's suit against her 
husband. 
The Court's interpretation of U.C.A. §30-2-4 (1953 as 
amended) in Stoker is in direct contravention of the court's 
earlier ruling in Rubalcava. In Rubalcava, 384 P.2d at 392, the 
Court states that "as will appear below in analyzing our statutes, 
no basis can be found therein for any distinction between inten-
tional or unintentional torts." Further, the court went on to 
construe the Married Women's Act as not allowing the wife a right 
to sue her husband, but only extending to her the right to sue 
third persons. 
In culmination of this direct conflict between Stoker and 
Rubalcava, the Stoker court at 592 held: 
The old common law fiction is not consonant with the 
realties of today. One of the strengths of the common 
law was its ability to change to meet changed conditions. 
Herer the Legislature did not wait for the common law to 
change, it made the change for it; and did so at a time 
when a great many of Utah's sister states were enacting, 
or had previously enacted, Married Women's Acts. Our 
holding today reaffirms the Legislative abrogation of 
Interspousal Immunity. That the trend in our sister 
states is certainly in consonance with our holding 
today: See 92 A.L.R.3d 901, at p. 923, et seq. 
(emphasis added) 
Plaintiff in its Trial Memorandum correctly asserts that 
changes in the Interspousal Tort Immunity Doctrine should be 
accomplished by the Legislature. As stated in Stoker the 
Legislature did not wait for the common law to change, "it made 
the change." Also, the Court stated that its holding "reaffirms 
the Legislative abrogation of Interspousal Immunity." 
Defendant asserts that the archaic common law doctrine of 
interspousal immunity has been invalidated by the Legislature as 
expressly held in Stoker, therefore, defendants suit against her 
husband for his tortious conduct should be allowed. 
Finally, Plaintiff in its Trial Memorandum gave great weight 
to Justice Crockett's dissenting ooinion of Stoker. This is fine 
if an understanding of the law before Stoker is desired, but if an 
understanding of the present law and its affect is desired, the 
court in this case should look to the actual law as decided in the 
majority opinion of Stoker. 
POINT II 
THE PUBLIC POLICY GROUNDS OF PRESERVING FAMILY HARMONY AND OF 
PREVENTING FRAUD AND COLLUSION DO NOT JUSTIFY THE APPLICATION OF 
THE INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN THE PRESENT CASE. 
In Rubalcavay Supra, the court noted that the two most 
widely accepted public policy grounds for retaining the doctrine 
of interspousal immunity were: (1) preserving family harmony, 
and (2) that where insurance is involved, collusion between 
spouses would be encouraged. Defendant contends that these were 
proper policy reasons to support interspousal immunity twenty 
years ago in the Rubalcava case. But under the Stoker case, the 
antiquated view of public policy reasons supporting Rubalcava is 
done away. In Stoker the court expressly states that it is 
following the trend in its sister states, which is "in 
consonance" with its holding by citing with approval 92 A.L.R. 
3d 901, at p. 923 et seq. (Stoker v. Stoker 616 P2d at 592). 
A brief review of the cases of sister states which were 
cited with approval in the A.L.R. annotation and "in consonance" 
with Stoker will support defendant's contention that family har-
mony and a danger of collusion are not persuasive arguments for 
the retention of interspousal immunitv. 
Cases found in 92 A.L.R. 3d 901, at p. 923 et seq., which 
support the argument that interspousal tort immunity is not 
effective for presentation of marital harmony are hereafter cited. 
In Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972), which was a 
negligent tort case for personal injury, the wife's suit was not 
barred by interspousal immunitv. In itfs holding the Court in 
Freehe reasoned that the motion that a suit for tort damages 
would destroy the peace and tranquility of the home is a 
"conclusion without a basis." The Court expressly rejected the 
notion that family peace and tranquility is a valid reason for 
precluding a cause of action in tort against the tort-feasor 
spouse. To support its holding the court in Freehe at 774 stated: 
If a state of peace and tranquility exists between 
the spouses, then the situation is such that either 
no action will be commenced or that the spouses—who 
are, after all, the best guardians of their own peace 
and tranquility—will allow the action to continue only 
so long as their personal harmony is not jeopardized. 
If peace and tranquility is nonexistent or tenuous to 
begin withf then the law's imposition of a technical 
disability seems more likely to be a bone of contention 
than a harmonizing factor. 
Defendant contends that the Intersoousal Tort Immunity 
Doctrine is counterproductive to marital harmony. If a spouse 
is not allowed to collect damages for a tortious wrong committed 
by the other spouse then it is "more likely to be a bone of con-
tention than a harmonizing factor. (Freehe, Supra.) One of the 
strongest policies in our society is the Preservation and 
encouragement of marriage as an institution. Illicit relation-
ships are, in fact, contrary to Utah law. If a spouse is not 
allowed to sue the other spouse for tortious actions, then this 
would not encourage or oreserve marital unitv or marriaqe as an 
institution, but would be a "bone of contention", or encourage 
some individuals not to marrv at all. For this reason, Plaintiff's 
contention that interspousal immunity maintains marital harmonv 
is in direct contravention of that socially desirable result. 
Along this same line, the Arizona Supreme Court in Fernandez 
v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878 (Ariz. 1982), abolished the Doctrine of 
Interspousal Tort Immunity in automobile accident cases. In 
support of its holding, the Court considered the argument of 
maintaining interspousal immunity to preserve family harmony, 
stating: 
We doubt however, that family harmony will be damaged 
any more by allowing a suit for the negligent infliction 
of injury upon a spouse than the damage that will be 
done if the injury goes unredressed. 
The Court further stated that the threat to marital harmony 
is small when there is the existence of liability insurance. The 
Court compared the disruption of family harmony in a suit between 
spouses and a suit between parent and child, and stated: 
Secondly, we cannot ignore the almost universal exis-
tence of liability insurance, particularly in the 
automobile accident realm. Where such insurance exists, 
the domestic tranquility arqument is hollow, for in 
reality the sought after litigation is not between 
child and parent but between child and parent's 
insurance carrier. * * * Streenz v. Streenz, 106 
Ariz. 86,88,471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970). 
We do not believe, considering the existence of auto-
mobile accident insurance, that the family harmony or 
domestic tranquility will be harmed by allowing suit for 
injuries. 
Therefore, Defendant asserts that as in Fernandez v. Romo 
there is no danger of domestic discord by allowing this suit. 
Here, as in Fernandez, liability insurance exists and as is 
evident by the verv fact of this suit the litigation is not bet-
ween husband and wife, but between wife and husband's insurance 
carrier (Plaintiff). 
Defendant contends that under U.C.A. §30-2-6, (1953 as 
amended) husband and wife have the right to sue each other con-
cerning property; also under Stoker v. Stoker, supra, husband 
and wife are permitted to sue each other for intentional tort 
damages. Therefore, these actions are "as likely to bring about 
conjugal discord, as are actions for personal torts, yet only 
personal tort claims have been precluded upon the ground that 
they would shatter the harmony of the family." (Rupert v. Stienne, 
528 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Nev. 1974).) Thus, defendant encourages the 
court to allow her suit because it is difficult to perceive how a 
personal action would disrupt the tranquility of the marital 
state to any greater degree than would actions in property, 
contract or intentional tort. (See Rogers v. Yellowstone Park 
Company 539 P.2d 566, 569 (Idaho 1975).) 
Other cases so holding that marital harmony is not preserved 
by the doctrine of interspousal immunity are: Crammer v. Cramer, 
379 P.2d 95,96 (Alaska 1963); Klein v. Klein 376 P.2d 70 (Cal. 
1962); Self v. Self 376 P.3d 65 (Cal. 1962); Courtnev v. Courtney 
87 P.2d 660 (Okl. 1938). 
Each of the above-mentioned cases concerning marital harmony 
also considered the argument that the Interspousal Immunity 
Doctrine prevents fraud and collusion. Plaintiff asserts that 
without spousal immunity that would lead to fraud and collusion, 
especially where an insurance company is involved. (Rubalcava 
(Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra, at 390.) This analysis, however, 
betrays an attitude of mistrust toward the American Judicial 
System. In Fernandez v. Romo, 882 Supra, the Arizona Supreme 
Court said: 
The idea of a husband and wife rising from the marriage 
bed, eating breakfast, and drivinq in the same automobile 
to court where, aided by their respective attorneys, they 
will testify against each other, does little to enhance 
the perception of justice and leads to a suspicion of 
collusion and fraud. We think the courts can control 
this, however, and the attorneys for the insurance 
company will, we are sure, be quick to detect and bring 
to the court's attention any evidence of collusive conduct 
by the parties. 
In Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Nev. 1974) the 
court stated: 
However, to deny one spouse the opportunity to recover 
from the tortious conduct of the other because of the 
possibility of fraud and collusion, belies the centuries 
old trust in our jury svstem. An interspousal tort claim 
should not be saddled with the presumption of fraud ab 
initio. Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okl. 395, 87 P.2d 660 
(1938). Our adversarv system will ferret out the non 
meritorious claims and dispatch those who would practice 
fraud upon the courts. 
The Court in Freehe v. Freehe, supra, at 775 also discussed 
the argument that abrogation of the doctrine would allow fraud 
upon the Court of collusive actions. 
[We reject] this "pessimistic premise" notinq that "this 
line of argument presupposes that courts are so inef-
fectual and the jurv svstem so imperfect that fradulent 
claims cannot be distinguished from the legitimate." 500 
P.2d at 775. 
That court also noted: 
Collusion in one class of cases than another does not 
warrant courts of law closing the door to all cases of 
that class. Courts must depend on the efficacy of the 
judicial process to ferret out the meritorious from the 
fraudulent in particular cases. Id. at 775. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in the Rogers v. Yellowstone Park, supra, 
followed this same logic: 
We reject this contention, for courts in this state 
presently weed out fraud and collusion in other cases 
not involving actions between spouses. We find nothing 
unusual or peculiar in interspousal suits to frustrate 
the capability of the judicial system to avoid or 
anticipate such abuses. 529 P.2d at 569. 
Therefore, Defendant contends that neither of the rationales 
of maintaining marital harmony and Dreventing fraud and collusion 
are valid public policies for disallowing her suit. Defendant 
submits that if her suit is denied on these grounds th§n she will 
have no remedy. If her suit is denied then the only remedies 
available would be the inadequate remedies of divorce or criminal 
law. The Washington court in Freehe v. Freehe, supra, at 774 
speaking of the remedies of divorce or criminal law stated: 
It has been observed that neither of these alternatives 
actually compensate for the damage done, or provides 
anv remedy for the nonintentional neqligent torts. . . 
We have previously observed that while "a criminal 
action may be adequate to prevent future wrongs. . . 
it certainly affords no compensation for oast injuries." 
To these reflections we add the observation that linutinq 
the injured partv to a divorce or criminal action aqainst 
his or her tort-feasor spouse is quite inconsistent with 
any policy of preserving domestic tranquilitv. Thus the 
argument base^ on suqgested legal alternatives simply 
does not withstand analvsis. 
Tn conclusion defendant urqes this Court to reverse the 
Trial Court and allow Mrs. Mastbaum suit aqainst her husband. As 
the late Justice Travnor so aotly stated, "the fictional unity of 
husband and wife has been substantially violated bv overwhelming 
evidence that one plus one adds up to twof even in togetherness. 
Thus, one spouse may recover against another in tort.M (People 
v. Pierce, 395 P.2d 893, 894 (Cal. 1964).) 
POINT III 
THE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE CONTAINED IN PLAINTIFF'S 
INSURANCE POLICY IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS IT IS VIOLATIVE 
OF PUBLIC POLICY UNDER UTAH LAW. 
The family exclusion clause in question is contained in 
Plaintiff's insurance policy, under Section 1 "Liability 
Coverages." The policy provides the following: 
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY UNDER: (h) COVERAGE A 
["Bodily injury sustained by other persons"], TO 
BODILY INJURY TO ANY INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF THE 
FAMILY OF AN INSURED RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD 
AS THE INSURED. (Emphasis contained in policy) 
This family exclusion clause is representative of the tvpical 
clause used bv insurers. All insurers commonly insert this type 
of clause within their policies to limit their liability. In 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Kay, 26 Utah 
2d. 195, 487 P.2d 852 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
such clauses were valid and not violative of public policy 
because they avoid collusive suits, and thev protect the insurer 
from the burden of defendinq a tort-feasor who is related to the 
Plaintiff. Defendant submits that even though the abovementioned 
case is currentlv thought to be the law in Utah concerning family 
exclusion clauses, recent case developments have shown that 
public policy has shifted and that Mrs. Mastbaum's suit should 
not be denied because of the family exclusion clause. 
In State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v, Kay, supra 
at 856, Defendant Kay asserted the argument that the household 
exclusion clause was void as a matter of public policy on the 
ground it was arbitrary and had no valid legal purpose. The 
Court rejected defendant's argument by relying on the language 
and holding of a Washington case, State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 467 P.2d 189 (Wash. 1970). The primary 
language from Phillips which the Utah Supreme Court cited with 
approval stated: 
The exclusion in question is a so-called "household or 
family exclusionary clause", the purpose of which is not 
only to protect insurers from collusion which might 
possibly arise in intrafamily suits but also to protect 
them from the natural tendency of one insured to strengthen 
or enlarge the case against him when it involves members 
of his household and family. There is a natural dispo-
sition to favor those in onefs household and close 
members of onefs family. The practical impossibility 
facing an insurer in defending such an action is readily 
apparent, and explains why this tvpe of exclusion is 
inserted in a policy. 
This rationale of Phillips became adopted in Utah in Kay. 
Defendants contend the rationale that the Court in State 
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v. Kay, supra, adopted from 
t
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 Phillips case is no longer valid as public oolicv. It is 
important to note that the Washington Supreme Court realized the 
invalidity of this rationale and overruled Phillips in Mutual of 
Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 62?, P.2d 1234 (Wash. 1^80). In 
Wiscomb, which was a case verv similar factually to the present 
case, the Court carefully analyzed the stated policy in Phillips 
of allowing the family exclusion clauses to prevent collusion, 
and to protect insurers from the natural tendency of insureds to 
enlarge the case when it involves a member of onefs family. The 
Washington Court stated that "as a private contractor, the 
insurer is ordinarily permitted to limit it's liability unless 
inconsistent with public policy of statute." Wiscomb, supra. The 
Wiscomb Court held that the family exclusion clause was violative 
of public policy, and not supported by the rationale of pre-
venting collusion of burden on insurers of enlarqing the case. 
The Court in Wiscomb found that the traditional rationales 
for the exclusion clause were not supportive of their continued 
existence. Citing Freehe v. Freehey 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972), 
which was decided after the Phillips case. The Court then stated 
at 500 P.2d 775: 
The courts may and should take cognizance of fraud and 
collusion when found to exist in a particular case. 
However, the fact that there may be greater opportunity 
for fraud or collusion in one class of cases than 
another does not warrant courts of law in closing the 
door to all cases of that class. Courts must depend 
upon the efficacy of the judicial processes to ferret 
out the meritorious from the fraudulent in particular 
cases. 
The Court further states: 
Tn Freehef the Court rejected the notion 'that courts 
are so ineffectual and the jurv system is so imperfect 
that fraudulent claims cannot be distinguished from 
the legitimate.' Freehe v. Freehey 81 Wash. 2d 183, 
189, 500 P.2d 771 (1972) quotinq Goode v. Martinis, 
58 Wash. 2d 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961). That reasoning 
seems equally applicable to this issue. 
Defendant's contention that collusion will run rampant in 
the area of interspousal immunity absent family exclusion clauses 
demonstrates an attitude of mistrust towards the judicial system. 
Defendant submits that the courts will be able to ferret out the 
meritorious from the fraudulent claims in most cases just as they 
do in other cases not involving interfamily suits. 
Plaintiff's assertion that the household exclusion clause 
should be allowed to afford protection to the insurer from collu-
sive suits of family members is "wholly unpersuasive because the 
exclusion far exceeds the evil which it is designed to protect 
against; collusion and fraud are the exception rather than the 
rule." (Wiscomb, supra) The family exclusion clause effectively 
closes the door to all types of cases in that class justified 
solely because there mav be a greater opportunity for fraud or 
collusion (Freehe, Supraf at 775). Defendant contends that this 
is why the collusion argument submitted bv Plaintiff is unper-
suasive. Defendant contends that this Court should follow the 
Wiscomb rationale and follow the modern trend of public policy 
that Utah has shifted towards allowing intrafamilv torts to be 
actionable at law. 
POINT IV 
UTAH'S SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT TS A DECLARATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY VOIDING THE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE. 
It is the Plaintiff's contention that the family exclusion 
clause (cited at page 19 infra) allows the Plaintiff to avoid 
liability coverage and the responsibilities of defending an 
action brought bv a member of an insured's household. Such a 
position, however, cannot be reconciled with policy declarations 
of the Utah Safety Responsibility Act, U.C.A. §41-12-1 et seq. 
(1953 as amended). 
The Utah Safety Responsibility Act requires motorists to 
carry insurance against loss resulting from liability imposed bv 
law for injuries suffered by any person. U.C.A. §41-12-21(b)(2) 
is typical of such all-inclusive language: 
(b) such ownerfs policy of liabilitv insurance: 
(1) (. . .) 
(2) shall insure the person named therein and any 
other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle 
or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission 
of such named insured, against loss from the liabilitv 
imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or motor 
vehicles within the United States of America or the 
Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of 
interest and costs, with respect to each such motor 
vehicle, in the amounts specified in §41-012-1 (k) of 
this Act. (emphasis added) 
In State Farm v. Kav, supra, the Plaintiff finds some refuge 
in the language of that case regarding a familv exclusion clause. 
Nevertheless, since the Kav case was decided the trend, both in 
case law and through legislative enactment, has been to the 
contrarv. The Utah No-Fault Insurance Act, U.C.A. §31-41-1 et 
seq. (1953 as amended), passed subsequent to the Kay case, man-
dates that an insurer provide statutory miminum insurance 
coverage. District Court, Judge Omer Call, in a similar case as 
this, has held in a Memorandum Decision dated June 1, 1982 (Civil 
No. 16765 Box Elder County, Utah) that: 
The requirements of the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act, 
incorporating provisions, relating to qualifications 
of insurance policies, of the Utah Safety Responsibility 
Act, establish a minimum liability coverage requirement 
of $15,000 per person, $30,000 two or more persons. The 
policy issued by plaintiff with it's "household or 
family exclusion clause11 is void after those minimum 
coverage requirements, but is enforceable as to coverage 
in excess thereof. 
(See the opinion in Estate of Neil v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 
566 P.2d 81, (Nev. 1977) which Judge Call expressly followed.) 
It is the defendant's position in this case that not only 
should the family exclusion clause be held void as to the minimum 
coverage requirement but should be held void in its entirety. 
(Emphasis Added) 
A number of courts have held that a Financial Responsibility 
Act similar to the one enacted in Utah effectively voids a house-
hold or family exclusion clause because such clauses are incon-
sistent and violative of public policy as expressed in those 
acts. In Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
236 N.W.2d 870, 882, 884 (1975) the North Dakota Court construed 
a nearly identical familv exclusion clause to be void stating: 
"The basic puroose for the legislature's enactment of 
financial resoonsiblitv laws was to nrotect innocent 
victims of motor vehicle accidents from financial 
disaster. 
The Court went on quoting from a North Dakota legislative report 
which stated: 
Financial responsibility laws have as their objective 
the compensation of innocent victims of traffic 
accidents, ^hus, thev are more concerned with the 
solution of economic problems created bv traffic 
accidents than with the orevention of traffic accidents, 
(emphasis added) 
This type of economic reasoning was followed in Atlantic National 
Insurance Company v. Armstrong, 416 P.2d 801, 805, 806 (Cal, 1966) 
wherein the Court said: 
A primary purpose of financial responsibility laws is 
to protect 'that ever changing and tragicallv large 
group of persons who while lawfully using the highways 
themselves suffer grave injury through the negligent 
use of the highway by others.' (cites omitted) This 
goal is no less subverted bv limiting the class of 
persons whose injuries are compensable than by limiting 
the class of drivers who are insured. Either tvpe of 
exclusion forces the injured person to rely exclusively 
upon the financial resources of the driver or owner in 
seeking compensation for his injuries. 
See also Stevens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, 519 P.2d 1157 (Ariz. ADO. 1974). 
Policy holders also have a reasonable right to expect pro-
tection and full coverage from their insurance comoany. In a 
recent decision the Montana Supreme Court held that: 
...the household exclusion clause is invalid due to 
its failure to fhonor the reasonable expectations' of 
the purchaser of the policy. 
The Court went on to quote from Keeton, "Insurance Rights at 
Variance with Policv Provisions", 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 967 
(1970) as follows: 
The objectively reasonably expectations of applicants 
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of 
insurance contracts will be honored even though 
painstaking study of the policy Provisions would 
have negated those expectations. 
The Court then found that the insurance policy was an "adhesion 
contract" to be strictly construed against the insurance company. 
In dealing with almost identical family exclusion language, 
a State Farm policy in Hughes, supra, at 885 was also found to 
be an adhesion contract. The Court said: 
In interpreting the terms of a policy of insurance, 
we are guided by the familar rule that, as an adhesion 
contract drawn by the company, it must be construed 
most strongly against the insurance company. (cites 
omitted) 
The North Dakota Court went on to quote from Continental Casualty 
Company v. Phoenix Construction Company, 296 P.2d 801 (Cal. 1956) 
which stated the governing principles for motor vehicle liability 
policies: 
It is elementary in insurance law that anv ambiguitv 
or uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved 
against the insurer... . If semantically oermissable, 
the contract will be qiven such construction as will 
fairly achieve its object of securinq indemnitv to the 
insured for the losses to which the insurance relates... . 
If the insurer uses language which is uncertain any 
reasonable doubt will be resolved against it; if the 
doubt relates to extent or fact of coverage, whether 
as to oeril insured against... , the amount of liability.. , 
or the oersons or persons protected.. , the language 
will be understood in its most inclusive sense, for the 
benefit of the insured. 
In the automobile insurance context, often aoolication for 
insurance is made and later, if approved, the actual policy is 
forwarded to the insured without his ever havinq a chance to 
preview it. This is normally a one-sided transaction with the 
insured having little or no bargaining power. For this reason, 
courts have stated as a qeneral principle of law that insurance 
contracts are adhesion contracts. A most recent statement to 
this affect was made in General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. 
Martinezy No. 18072 (decided May 24, 1983) wherein the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Credit life and accident insurance are generally 
contracts of adhesion which are not negotiated at 
arm's length and which usually contain various 
provisions for protection of the interests of the 
insurance company. 
Given the express public policy in the Utah Financial 
Responsibility Act and the No-Fault Insurance Provisions enacted 
into statute, and in consideration of the adhesive characteristics 
of insurance contracts, the family exclusion clause in question 
herein should be declared void and without effect by this 
Honorable Court. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the Doctrine of 
Interspousal Tort Immunity has been overruled in the State of Utah 
or this Court in this decision overruled the same as violating a 
public policy of the State of Utah and has no application in the 
State of Utah. That this Court further hold that the family 
Exclusion Provision of the Plaintifffs insurance contract violates 
the public oolicy of the State of Utah and is violative of the 
public policy behind the Utah Safety Responsibility Act, 30-2-4 
UCA 1953 as amended, and Article I, Section 3 1 of the Utah 
Constitution. That the Trial Court be reversed in this matter 
and that the Defendants be allowed to proceed with the suit pre-
sently pending in the District Court of Cache County, Utah, filed 
as Civil No. 21668, and the Plaintiff herein be required to 
defend the Defendant, Thomas Lavton Mastbaum said suit and be 
required to respond to any damages that may be awarded Mrs. 
Mastbaum against her husbandf Thomas Layton Mastbaum, for which 
he was responsible resulting from the automobile accident of May 
30, 1981 near Garden City, Utah. That the Defendants herein be 
awarded their costs accordingly. 
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